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SO YOU WANT TO BE AN AUTHOR: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF THE AUTHORIAL RIGHTS 
AWARDED TO PERFORMERS 
DANIEL GOMEZ† 
INTRODUCTION 
In his classic 1980 song “On the Road Again,” Willie Nelson 
articulates that “the life [he] love[s] is making music with [his] 
friends.”1  This affinity for the life of a traveling performer likely 
has little to do with his authorial rights under the Copyright 
Act.2  However, as this Note demonstrates, Mr. Nelson indeed 
benefited from favorable authorial rights when compared to other 
types of performers, beyond the rights he acquired as the song’s 
writer.  Specifically, the current law around the default authorial 
rights of performers provides greater protection to performers of 
sound recordings than it affords to visual and audiovisual 
performers.3  
Intellectual property scholar Justin Hughes has explored 
this differential in copyright authorial protections in what he la-
beled a “[t]hought [e]xperiment[ ].”4  In his experiment, Hughes 
compared the authorial protections afforded to musicians with 
those afforded to actors while minimizing all other creative con-
tributions to the point of nullity.5  This Note seeks to expand on 
 
† Staff Member, St. John’s Law Review, J.D., 2020, St. John’s University School 
of Law; B.S., 2018, St. John’s University. 
1 WILLIE NELSON, On the Road Again, on HONEYSUCKLE ROSE (Columbia 
Records 1980). 
2 Michael Hall, Why Does Willie Nelson Still Do It?, TEXAS MONTHLY (Apr. 18, 
2018), https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/why-does-willie-nelson-still-do-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/6JEL-NHT6]. 
3 For the purposes of this Note, I have limited my analysis to the protections 
afforded to musical artists compared to those of photograph subjects and actors. 
4 Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law, 51 CONN. L. 
REV. 1, 36–39 (2019). 
5 Id. Hughes notes that the reasoning of the legislative history to the 1976 
Copyright Act was that in cases where a sound recording’s producer contributes 
minimally to the sound recording, the performer of the sound recording is given 
authorship. Id. at 37–38. Further, Hughes argues that the same protection should be 
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Hughes’s thought experiment.  Namely, it examines the law sur-
rounding the default authorial rights of photographic subjects, 
actors, and musicians.  This examination demonstrates that both 
actors and photographic subjects receive disproportionately min-
imal authorial recognition when compared to musicians.  This 
Note then argues that the minimal default authorial protection 
afforded to actors and photographic subjects does not honor their 
labor rights.  Further, it argues that the best way to correct the 
discrepancies between the authorial rights awarded to perform-
ers in these different fields is to expansively apply the doctrine of 
joint authorship. 
Part I of this Note addresses how creative labor actually oc-
curs in performance settings, how default protection is dispa-
rately awarded within these performance settings, and why 
protecting performers’ creative contributions is important.  Part 
II discusses possible copyright vehicles that are relevant to the 
issue of authorial rights of performers.  That Part looks at the 
doctrines of work for hire, joint authorship, and implied licenses.  
Finally, Part III explains why an amended joint authorship 
doctrine would be the most helpful doctrine to equalize the 
authorship rights of performers and also addresses some counter-
arguments against allowing performers to be protected as joint 
authors. 
I.  CREATIVE LABOR AND THE 
PROBLEM OF DISPARATE PROTECTION 
A. Creative Labor in Performance Settings 
1. Photography  
In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Supreme 
Court of the United States provided some instruction as to how 
creative labor is carried out in the context of photography.6  
There, the Court highlighted that the photographer’s creative 
contribution was so pervasive that it warranted granting author-
ship rights over a photograph.7  Indeed, courts have identified 
 
afforded to an actor who performs a Shakespearean soliloquy if all other creative 
contributions can be reduced. Id. at 39. 
6 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884). 
7 Id. at 60. 
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three ways photographers contribute originality to photographic 
works: “rendition,” “timing,” and “creation of the subject.”8 
Originality in rendition is the creative labor that the photog-
rapher employs without regard to the subject or the setting of the 
photo—aspects such as lighting, angles, and developing tech-
niques.9  Undoubtedly, photographers often have specialized 
knowledge and skills.10  This may include specialized skills in the 
effective use of light, abstract forms, and special equipment; or it 
may involve specialized knowledge of art more generally.11  
Originality in timing is the photographer’s being in the “right 
place at the right time.”12  This highlights the photographer’s cre-
ative labor in choosing just when and where to snap a picture.13  
Finally, creation of the subject is the photographer’s creative 
labor of setting the scene or subject in a precise way.14  This 
originality applies to the photographer’s special artistic vision 
that the subject could not contribute on his or her own.15  These 
contributions are clearly important in producing a valuable 
photograph. 
However, these points of originality ignore the fact that the 
photographer is not the sole contributor to a photograph.  Indeed, 
the art of photography is collaborative, requiring cooperation 
from the photographer and the photographic subject.  This reality 
means that, oftentimes, the value of a photograph is not solely a 
product of the photographer’s artfulness, but rather, of the contri-
bution of the subject involved.16  Notably, a spontaneous, creative 
 
8 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
9 Id. at 452. 
10 See Ming Thein, What Makes a Good Photographer?, MING THEIN: BLOG (Feb. 
9, 2013), https://blog.mingthein.com/2013/02/09/what-makes-a-good-photographer/ 
[https://perma.cc/L9NY-RANY]. 
11 Id. 
12 Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53. 
13 Id. at 453. 
14 Id. 
15 Benjamin Falk’s description of his methods demonstrates this artistic vision. 
He would “make the subject so forget his surroundings as to mentally assume the 
part or character to be represented in the picture” and use curtains and lights to 
bring out the intended effects. Eva E. Subotnik, The Author Was Not an Author: The 
Copyright Interests of Photographic Subjects from Wilde to Garcia, 39 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 449, 456 (2016) (quoting Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 33 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893)). 
The subject likely could not do this him or herself.  
16 “It is perfectly clear that the object of such photographs is merely to have a 
large public sale. This is accomplished not by the accessories of the pose of the party 
photographed, but by the greater or less fame or notoriety which the subject of the 
photograph has acquired.” Id. at 452 (quoting Statement and Brief for Plaintiff in 
Error at 14, Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (No. 1071)). 
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contribution from a subject, neither foreseen nor arranged by the 
photographer, can sometimes become the most prevalent and 
valuable creative addition to the photograph.17   
For example, photographer Jim Marshall’s iconic picture of 
Johnny Cash in San Quentin State Prison—pointing his middle 
finger at the camera lens—is famous not because of masterful 
arrangement from the photographer, but rather because Cash 
opted to perform that gesture out of his own volition.18  Marshall 
recounted that he told Cash “John, let’s do a shot for the warden,” 
to which Cash responded by “flipp[ing] the camera the bird.”19  
This spontaneous, though provoked, reaction from Cash was 
more the product of his own creativity and not the careful 
development of an artistic vision or originality in the creation of 
the photographer.  Marshall most certainly contributed creative-
ly by being at the right time and place to take and provoke the 
photograph; however, Cash also contributed creatively to the 
photograph in choosing to pose in the iconic way he did.  Indeed, 
Cash’s independent creative contribution to the picture created 
the photograph that Marshall described as “probably the most 
ripped off photograph in the history of the world.”20  And yet, Cash 
presumably received no copyright interest in the photograph.21 
2. Film  
There are two prevailing views regarding the creative ex-
pression contributed by actors.22  The first is that actors only 
follow the orders of a director and follow a script.23  Thus, they 
contribute little or nothing creatively.24  Even if not a copyright-
able contribution, however, an actor under this view does contrib-
ute to a film in his or her creative recitation of the words on the 
 
17 See, e.g., Priya Elan, Johnny Cash Photographer Reveals Truth Behind San 
Quentin Prison Shot, NME (Mar. 18, 2011, 1:04 PM), https://www.nme.com/news/ 
music/johnny-cash-19-1292708#Mw1zEKb1RV7FdRwC.99 [https://perma.cc/DWW6-
T34J]. 
18 Id. Admittedly, there may have been originality in the timing of the photogra-
pher. See supra text accompanying note 12. The iconic image may be found in an 
article online. See Elan, supra note 17.  
19 See Elan, supra note 17. 
20 Id. 
21 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
22 See Hughes, supra note 4, at 41–43. 
23 Id. at 42. Hughes describes this as “recitation or ‘recitation+’: recitation with 
authenticity, recitation with sincerity,” and so on. Id. 
24 Id. at 43. 
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script.25  Though this seems to be the view taken by courts, as 
discussed below, it may not be reflective of reality.26 
A second view is that actors contribute a great deal 
creatively to films, because their expressions, enunciations, and 
accentuations help create strong or realistic characters and 
strong emotional connections.27  This view comports with the idea 
that “[t]he creative process of shooting a film is often more 
collaborative with significant modifications contributed by the 
actor.”28  These “modifications” can include actors adding expres-
sive elements to characters that were not sought by the director, 
like ad-libbed lines, pauses, inflections, or even tics.29  As dis-
cussed below, this view seems to acknowledge the realities of the 
acting industry more effectively.30 
For example, in Heath Ledger’s Oscar-winning performance 
of the Joker in the movie The Dark Knight, Ledger adopted a 
tongue tic in his performance that some describe as “[t]he most 
identifiable characteristic” of the villain.31  However, this habit 
was not a product of careful direction, but rather, a habit of 
 
25 See id. at 48. “Nonetheless, one could still conclude that while ‘genuine human 
creativity’ goes ‘into acting a script’ nonetheless ‘this creativity is different in kind 
and in degree from the creativity that goes into creating the fixed, author-driven 
works like literature and visual art.’ ” Id. (quoting Jacob M. Victor, Garcia v. Google 
and a “Related Rights” Alternative to Copyright in Acting Performances, 124 YALE 
L.J.F. 80, 86 (2014)). 
26 Id. at 41 (“But no director has complete control over human actors, whether 
they are acting in front of the camera, only lending their voices to CGI-created 
cartoon characters, or merely operating marionettes. . . . [W]ithin the realm of what 
a director can theoretically control, many directors cede substantial leeway to 
actors.”). 
27 Id. This is putting aside those works where an actor makes extra-acting con-
tributions as well, such as ad-libbing lines or contributing to the script. Id. at 45–46. 
28 Id. at 46. 
29 See id. at 46–47.  
30 See id. at 41, 46–49. Famous examples of actor-contributed modifications 
include Heath Ledger’s choice to fidget with the remote detonator in the hospital 
explosion scene in The Dark Night, where the script merely told him to walk away 
from the explosion. See Paul Young, The 32 Greatest Unscripted Movie Scenes, 
SCREEN RANT (Oct. 2, 2012), https://screenrant.com/greatest-unscripted-movie-
scenes/ [https://perma.cc/U8VA-QZWA]. Ledger’s contribution added “a slight 
amount of dark humor to what would have just been a serious scene.” Id. Another 
example is Dustin Hoffman’s iconic “I’m walkin’ here!” line in Midnight Cowboy 
when a real New York City taxicab interrupted the film’s shooting. Id.  
31 See Emily Zogbi, 7 Things You Didn’t Know About The Dark Night, 
NEWSWEEK (July 18, 2018, 11:29 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/7-things-you-
didnt-know-about-dark-knight-facts-1030256 [https://perma.cc/9YKJ-J7CA]; see also 
THE DARK KNIGHT (Warner Bros. Pictures 2008); Heath Ledger, IMDB, 
https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0005132/awards (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/2ZCJ-MM4E]. 
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Ledger’s addition.32  This “cannily menacing” gesture was actual-
ly Ledger’s effort to keep his prosthetics in place and an 
exaggeration of a tic that Ledger had.33  Another example of the 
collaborative interplay between actors and directors is the final 
scene in the film Call Me by Your Name.  In that scene, lead 
actor Timothée Chalamet looks directly into the camera’s lenses 
while crying over the loss of his first love.34  In the film’s 
commentary, Chalamet describes this intimate, improvised 
moment as a “little homage to Boyhood here at the end, stealing 
a two-second look into the lens.”35  This moving moment in the 
film is an example of an actor independently contributing crea-
tively to a film.  Chalamet contributed this powerful moment to 
the film of his own accord; he was not carrying out a director’s 
will, but rather he was apparently providing a moving allusion to 
another film.36  And yet neither Ledger nor Chalamet presumably 
received copyright interests in their respective films. 
3. Music 
The traditional model for the creation of music involved an 
initial composition process and a later performance process.37  In 
the composition phase, a composer would engage in the “delibera-
tive activity” of writing and retooling a musical score.38  This was 
followed by the “unrepeatable” interpretive process of having a 
musician, or group of musicians, perform that composed piece.39  
Such a practice created a belief that the musicians were es-
sentially conduits for the work and not necessarily creative 
 
32 See Zogbi, supra note 31. 
33 Estelle Tang, I Am Heath Ledger: A New Documentary Takes an Intimate 
View of the Actor, ELLE (May 15, 2017), https://www.elle.com/culture/movies-
tv/news/a45267/i-am-heath-ledger-documentary/ [https://perma.cc/6AXT-EU45]; see 
Shaheera Anwar, 5 Unknown Facts About Heath Ledger’s Joker, THE EXPRESS 
TRIBUNE (Jan. 23, 2018), https://tribune.com.pk/story/1616036/4-5-unknown-facts-
heath-ledgers-joker [https://perma.cc/5Q8H-SS6H]. 
34 CALL ME BY YOUR NAME (Sony Pictures 2017). 
35 San Vu, Call Me by Your Name Commentary Track[—]Timothée Chalamet & 
Michael Stuhlbarg, YOUTUBE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://youtu.be/njg7Ee_jiyM 
[https://perma.cc/2X7W-7K4F]. 
36 Id. Costar Michael Stuhlbarg praised this creative choice from Chalamet in 
the commentary. Id. 
37 Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound 
Technology: Looking Beyond Composition and Performance, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 1, 7–8 (2014). In essence, the practice of creating music encompassed 
both the writing stage and the playing or performing stage. Id. 
38 Id. at 8.  
39 Id.  
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contributors themselves.40  Indeed, the Copyright Office’s policies 
reflected this belief, as “[f]rom 1790 through 1977, federal copy-
right protection for musical compositions could be obtained only 
through fixation in, and publication of, musical scores.”41 
Today, the creation of musical pieces no longer revolves 
around a written score.42  Indeed, “an analysis” conducted by 
Robert Brauneis “of more than 4.5 million musical work copy-
right registrations at the U.S. Copyright Office from 1978 
through 2012” reflects this trend.43  In his analysis, Brauneis 
found that, during the period covered by his study, the percent-
age of musical work registrations that included notations 
dropped from eighty-six percent to seventeen percent for un-
published musical works, and from eighty-six percent to twenty-
seven percent for published works.44 
 
40 Cf. id. at 10 (“As Elijah Wald put it, what became popular for a few months in 
the late 1800s and early 1900s was not a particular recording, but a song . . . .”) 
(citing ELIJAH WALD, HOW THE BEATLES DESTROYED ROCK ‘N’ ROLL: AN 
ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC 87 (2009)).  
41 Id. at 12. 
42 Id. at 28.  
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 29.  
In 1978, [eighty-six percent] of musical works registered were accompanied 
by deposits of notation and only [fourteen percent] by phonorecord deposits. 
By 2012, [seventy-seven percent] of musical work registrations were accom-
panied by phonorecord deposits and only [seventeen percent] by deposits of 
musical notation ([six percent] were accompanied only by deposits of text—
lyrics—and hence technically were not musical works).  
Id. at 28.  
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Figure: Musical Work Copyright Registrations, 1978–2012 
Deposits and Types45 
Indeed, in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress acknowledged 
the changing nature of the music industry by permitting the 
registration of phonorecords.46  This change recognized that, in 
the modern era, there is often no prewritten composition, and 
only an unwritten creative process from the musician.47  Further, 
the 1976 Copyright Act preserved protections for sound record-
ings, which Congress had enacted in the Sound Recording Act of 
1971.48  These protections had previously acknowledged that per-
formances of composed works are creative endeavors in and of 
themselves, separate and apart from the underlying composition. 
 
45 Id. at 29. 
46 Id. at 31. The 1976 Copyright Act permitted the limited copyright protection 
of sound recordings, recognizing that performers also contribute greatly to musical 
works. See id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 31–32. In 1994, Congress further expanded protections to musical 
performers when it adopted the Anti-Bootlegging Act as part of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, which extended copyright protection to live performances, imposing 
both civil, 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2018), and criminal, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2018), penal-
ties for infringers—though the constitutionality of these provisions has been 
questioned by courts. Andrew B. Peterson, Note, To Bootleg or Not to Bootleg? 
Confusion Surrounding the Constitutionality of the Anti-Bootlegging Act Continues, 
58 OKLA. L. REV. 723, 723–725, 723 n.2 (2005). Although the adoption of the anti-
bootlegging provisions is emblematic of Congressional willingness to protect musical 
performers, the provisions do not grant authorial protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101; 
18 U.S.C. § 2319A. 
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Thus, musicians are no longer seen as mere conduits for 
prewritten compositions, but rather as active creators in the 
musical process who operate in collaborative settings.49  Indeed, 
musical performers may work with producers in recording a 
work, or interpreting another’s composition in their own original 
way, but either way, they often contribute creatively to the final 
sound recording in a manner that is acknowledged under copy-
right law.50 
4. Three Different Collaborative Creations  
In sum, photographic subjects, actors, and musicians all can 
deliver lofty creative contributions to a work.  All three kinds of 
performers work in collaborative, creative endeavors, and all 
three add creative elements to those endeavors.51  By way of ex-
amples addressed above, photographic subjects can add noto-
riety, expressions, and gestures to a piece; actors can provide 
expression to the words of a script, improvise scenes and lines, 
and bring films to life; and musicians can create melodies, 
inflections, and creative interpretation to music.52 
Thus, it is difficult to define bright lines of requisite 
creativity by field.  Indeed, the creative contribution of a per-
former will largely depend not on the industry, but rather on the 
particular creative work.  For example, a photographic subject’s 
contribution may be greater in cases where the subject is given 
great latitude to select the setting of the photo, the pose, or the 
light, but lesser where the photographer has carefully curated 
the setting, dictated the pose, or otherwise directed the captured 
photo.  Likewise, an actor’s creative labor may be greater where 
he or she is permitted to improvise lines or independently make 
choices about performance details or character attributes.  How-
ever, where an actor is given very little discretion to make these 
kinds of decisions—and is more closely guided by a director—his 
or her creative labor may be significantly reduced.  Similarly, a 
musical performer may contribute more creative labor to a work 
where the producer merely records the musician’s performance 
 
49 See MELVILE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 11 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 803.3 
(2017) (addressing the collaboration between producers and performers). 
50 Id. § 803.5. Moreover, recording a musical performance can include not only a 
singular performer, but also a band, and a producer. Id. § 803.3(A)–(B). 
51 See discussion supra Sections I.A.1–3.  
52 See id. 
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without adding much, but less where a producer is playing a 
larger role in editing or adding to the performance.  
However, as addressed below, the law does not effectively 
recognize these nuances.53  Rather, the law distinguishes among 
the three groups discussed above by offering greater authorial 
protection to musical performers than to similarly creative 
photographic subjects and actors. 
B. Existing Copyright Law Surrounding Authorship of Works 
1. Photography 
The weight of precedent suggests that as a default rule, 
photographic subjects cannot exert authorial rights over a photo-
graph that they are featured in.54  In this context, authorship, 
and therefore copyright, of the photograph is attributed to the 
photographer.55 
As briefly highlighted above, the Supreme Court addressed 
the question of who qualifies as the author of a photograph as 
early as 1884.56  In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the 
Court confronted the authorship of a picture taken by Napoleon 
Sarony of Oscar Wilde.57  Ultimately, the Court determined that 
the proper author of the photograph was Sarony, because much 
of the artistic vision came from Sarony’s “mental conception.”58  
Yet, despite this determination, the Court failed to address 
whether or not Wilde had contributed authorial creativity.59   
 
53 See infra Section I.B. 
54 See generally Subotnik, supra note 15. Subotnik’s Article outlines various 
cases and details the authorship doctrine for photographs. Id. 
55 See id. at 449.  
56 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54 (1884). 
57 Id. at 54–55. 
58 Id. at 60. The Court noted that the photograph was made  
entirely from [Sarony’s] own original mental conception, to which he gave 
visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting 
and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said 
photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, 
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the 
desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or 
representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.  
Id. 
59 Subotnik, supra note 15, at 452. Subotnik posits that “perhaps the Supreme 
Court’s failure to engage with Wilde’s possible authorial contributions is due to” the 
simple reason that “Sarony and Wilde had a contract in place.” Id. 
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This decision was soon thereafter interpreted by several 
cases involving the photographer Benjamin Falk.60  In these cases, 
the old Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York denied 
authorial protection to photographic subjects.61  However, in Press 
Publishing Co. v. Falk, the court distinguished the context of a 
consumer paying for a photograph, where ownership of the rights 
in the photograph would lie with the paying consumer, and the 
context of “a person submit[ting] himself or herself as a public 
character, to a photographer,” where ownership of the copyright 
would lie with the photographer.62   
This approach has largely persisted.63  Further, the copyright 
protection for photographic subjects who contract to have their 
photograph taken was not codified in the list of works under the 
work for hire provision of the 1976 Copyright Act.64  Even more 
colorfully, in the 1989 case, Olan Mills, Inc. v. Eckerd Drug of 
Texas, Inc., the court concluded that “[t]he simple fact that an 
individual brings his own image to the studio is not enough to 
give that person a protectable property right in the portrait.”65  
This case and others like it appear to reject that a photographic 
subject could be a joint author of a photograph.66   
For example, in Janik v. SMG Media, Inc., the Southern 
District of New York held that a photo of Spin Magazine founder 
Bob Guccione Jr. was solely authored by the photographer.67  The 
court stated that the simple choice of the subject to be photo-
graphed does not convey joint authorship to that subject.68  
Further, the court stated that it was “doubtful” that Guccione 
 
60 Id. at 452–58 (citing Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., 48 F. 678 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1891); Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893); Press Publ’g Co. v. Falk, 59 
F. 324 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894)). 
61 See Brett Lithographing Co., 48 F. at 679; Donaldson, 57 F. at 33–34; Press 
Publ’g Co., 59 F. at 325–26. 
62 Press Publ’g Co., 59 F. at 325–26. 
63 Subotnik, supra note 15, at 458. Subotnik notes that the analysis was largely 
about ownership, and not precisely authorship. Id. She further notes that some 
courts acknowledged the rights of photographic subjects who paid to be 
photographed, or had serious privacy interests in ownership of the photographs. Id. 
64 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
65 No. CA3-88-0333-D, 1989 WL 90605, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 1989).  
66 Id.; see also Janik v. SMG Media, Inc., 16 Civ. 7308 (JGK) (AJP), 2018 WL 
345111, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2018). A “joint work” is defined as “a work pre-
pared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged 
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101; see 
also infra Section II.B. 
67 Janik, 2018 WL 345111, at *8. 
68 Id. at *8 n.5. 
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had contributed copyrightable creativity in the photograph.69  
Indeed, even Guccione’s choice “to stick out his tongue” was held 
to be an insufficient creative contribution to establish any au-
thorship over that photograph.70   
Thus, the law has historically failed to—and continues to fail 
to—offer significant authorial protections for photograph subjects 
despite the creative labor photographic subjects can add to a 
photograph.71 
2. Film 
Courts have rarely addressed the issue of the authorship 
rights of actors.72  When it has been addressed, courts have ex-
pressed only narrow circumstances where an actor may have an 
authorial interest in a work.73  These narrow circumstances in-
clude Peter Seller’s contribution to The Pink Panther74 and a 
group of actors from a Puerto Rican television show.75  The ques-
tion of whether actors can assert authorial rights over their 
creative contributions came to a climax in the controversial 
Ninth Circuit decision Garcia v. Google, Inc.76 
In 2011, actress Cindy Lee Garcia filmed a part for what she 
was told was “an action-adventure thriller set in ancient Arabia,” 
entitled Desert Warrior.77  Her role consisted of two sentences, for 
which she was paid $500.78  Desert Warrior was never actually 
released.79  Instead, the director used the scenes that had been 
filmed under the pretense of filming Desert Warrior to manufac-
 
69 Id. at *8. 
70 Id. at *8 n.5. 
71 See supra Section I.A.1. 
72 Hughes, supra note 4, at 16. 
73 Id. at 21–22; see also Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 
962, 970 (9th Cir. 2008); TMTV Corp. v. Pegasus Broad. of San Juan, 490 F. Supp. 
2d 228, 236 (D.P.R. 2007). 
74 See Richlin, 531 F.3d at 964, 970. 
75 See TMTV Corp., 490 F. Supp. 2d at 230. TMTV sued Pegasus Broadcasting 
for creating a show with some of the same actors playing identical or similar 
characters to a show TMTV had created earlier; however, the court denied TMTV’s 
motion for summary judgment on the basis that there was a “reasonable inference” 
that in portraying the characters, the actors contributed creatively to the original 
characters so as to make the actors authors. Id. at 236.  
76 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
77 Id. at 737. 
78 Id. Garcia’s part was to “seem[ ] concerned” while saying, “Is George crazy? 
Our daughter is but a child?” Id. (alteration in original). 
79 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 
F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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ture an offensive, fourteen-minute trailer for a film entitled 
Innocence of Muslims.80  While the trailer included Garcia’s image, 
her lines were dubbed “so that she appeared to be asking, ‘Is your 
Mohammed a child molester?’ ”81  In 2012, that trailer was re-
leased on YouTube to protests and violence.82  Garcia received death 
threats, notably from a fatwa issued by an Egyptian cleric urging 
“Muslim Youth in America[ ]” to kill those involved in making the 
film.83 
Garcia sued to have the film removed from YouTube, assert-
ing that she had a copyright interest in her performance.84  The 
district court declined to award a preliminary injunction on the 
grounds that Garcia had not established a likelihood of success 
on the merits on her claim of authorship of her performance.85  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, acknowledging that “Garcia 
may have [acquired] a copyright interest in her performance.”86 
This opinion was met with criticism and in late 2014, the 
Ninth Circuit decided to rehear the case en banc.87  Upon rehear-
ing, the court issued an opinion rejecting Garcia’s copyright 
claim.88  The court based its reasoning largely on policy concerns.89  
In essence, the court feared that awarding authorial rights to ac-
tors and actresses would result in awarding a copyright interest 
to the “cast of thousands,” which would result in a “logistical and 
financial nightmare” for the film industry.90  Though the decision 
will likely not have far-reaching effects on the film industry 
because of the contractual nature of authorship rights, its 
 
80 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737. This film is grossly offensive to people of the Muslim 
faith, as it “depicts the Prophet Mohammed as, among other things, a murderer, 
pedophile, and homosexual.” Id. 
81 Id. at 932. 
82 Id. at 737–38; see also, e.g., Orla Guerin, Deadly Film Protests in Pakistan, 
BBC (Sep. 21, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-19671703/deadly-film-
protests-in-pakistan [https://perma.cc/3LB9-HD2C]. The film was also even 
“purported[ly]” related to the 2012 “attack on the United States Consulate in 
Benghazi, Libya.” Garcia, 786 F.3d at 738. 
83 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 738 (alteration in original). 
84 Garcia v. Nakoula, No. CV 12-08315, 2012 WL 12878355, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 
30, 2012), rev’d sub nom. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en 
banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). 
85 Id. at *1.  
86 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 935, 940 (emphasis added). Though the dissent did not 
agree that Garcia could establish exclusive authorship, it seemed to suggest that Garcia 
could well be a joint author based on her acting. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 25.  
87 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647, 647 (9th Cir. 2014). 
88 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 747. 
89 Id. at 742–43. 
90 Id. 
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holding has essentially obliterated any possibility of authorial 
rights of actors in their creative contributions to works.91 
3. Music 
The law surrounding the authorship rights of musicians in 
sound recordings is far more permissive.  Indeed, the leading 
copyright treatise, the legislative history to the 1976 Copyright 
Act, and the copyright office have recognized that, in works of 
sound recording, the producer and the performer contribute 
copyrightable creativity.92 
The influential treatise Nimmer on Copyright outlines that, 
for sound recordings, there are two types of authorship: 
“[a]uthorship in the performance[ ]” and “[a]uthorship in the 
production.”93  Authorship in the production “include[s] capturing 
and manipulating sounds and compiling and editing those 
sounds to make a final recording.”94  These activities serve to rec-
ognize the creative labor of producers of sound recordings.95  On 
the other hand, authorship in the performance “include[s] play-
ing an instrument, singing, or speaking, or creating other sounds 
which are captured and fixed in the sound recording.  Individual 
performance authorship may be claimed only if the sound 
recording is comprised solely of an individual performance that is 
sufficiently creative.”96  This type of authorship validates the 
creative labor of musical performers.97  
 
 
91 See 2 PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2018, at 606 (2018) 
(“This decision is unlikely to have a significant effect on filmmaking since motion 
pictures are among the works eligible for work-made-for-hire status and studios 
routinely require actors to execute work-made-for-hire agreements. . . . Nonetheless, 
the decision negates actors’ claims to copyright in film projects.”). However, in 16 
Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, the Second Circuit, relying on the Garcia decision, found 
that a director’s contribution to a film did not constitute a work of authorship and 
thus did not vest a copyrightable interest in that film to the director. 791 F.3d 247, 
258–59 (2d Cir. 2015).  
92 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.3; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669; Circular 56: Copyright Registra-
tion for Sound Recordings, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 1, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/ 
circ56.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ5K-QRYT] (last updated Mar. 2019).  
93 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.3. 
94 Id. § 803.3(B). 
95 Id. § 803.3. 
96 Id. § 803.3(A). 
97 See id.; see also supra Section I.A.3. 
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According to Nimmer, based on the combination of creative 
labor in play, the law recognizes that 
[g]enerally, both the performer and the producer of a sound 
recording of a musical performance or spoken word performance 
contribute copyrightable authorship to the sound recording.  In 
some cases, however, the main or sole contribution may be 
production authorship (as in a recording of bird songs, where 
there is no human performance) or the main contribution may 
be performance authorship (as in a recorded performance where 
the only production involved is to push the “record” button).98 
This position serves to recognize that each creative work at issue 
will involve a collaboration of creative labor, and that the degree 
to which a performer or producer contributes creative labor into 
that particular work is relevant to determine authorship.99  
However, they often share in authorship as joint authors.100 
Similarly, the House Report to the 1976 Copyright Act 
recognized that a musical performer could assert authorship over 
a sound recording.101  Moreover, as recently as 2019, the Copy-
right Office, in its circular on the registration of sound 
recordings, endorsed the view that musical performers can have 
authorship over sound recordings.102  The circular states that 
“[t]he author of a sound recording is the performer featured in 
the recording and the producer who captured and processed the 
sounds that appear in the final recording.”103  Therefore, in this 
context, there appears to be an increased validation of a per-
former’s right to authorship over his or her creative contributions 
to a work, to some degree. 
 
98 NIMMER. & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.3. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. § 803.8(B). See discussion infra Section II.B. 
101 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5669.  
The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though 
not always, involve “authorship” both on the part of the performers whose 
performance is captured and on the part of the record producer responsible 
for setting up the recording session, capturing and electronically processing 
the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final sound 
recording. There may, however, be cases where the record producer’s 
contribution is so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable 
element in the work, and there may be cases (for example, recordings of 
birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, et cetera) where only the record producer’s 
contribution is copyrightable.  
Id.  
102 Circular 56, supra note 92, at 3. 
103 Id. 
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C. Why Protect Performers Anyway? 
Modern copyright jurisprudence largely treats copyright pro-
tection as a utilitarian effort to increase “economic efficiency.”104  
However, “this vision alone cannot adequately guide the devel-
opment of copyright law.”105  Indeed, it would be remiss to ignore 
the “unmistakable” factor of authors’ natural law rights,106 name-
ly, “that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own 
ingenuity and labour.”107  Indeed, though modern copyright law 
tends to view protection as a means for serving the public 
interest in receiving creative works, it also serves to give authors 
the fruits of their labor.108 
Moreover, “[t]he appropriateness of this reference to natural 
law becomes even more clear when one considers the fact that 
copyright law protects works for which no economic incentive is 
required to induce creation.”109  Further, vindicating the rights of 
performances is consistent with the utilitarian underpinnings of 
intellectual property law because it incentivizes the creative 
labor created by performers.110 
 
104 Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and 
Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517 (1990). 
105 Id. at 519. 
106 Id. at 521. 
107 Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2398 (KB), overruled by Donaldson v. 
Becket (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (HL). 
108 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 657 (1834).  
109 Yen, supra note 104, at 537. Yen cites protections for “works authored by 
students to fulfill academic requirements[,] results of accidents[,] and products 
which the government requires public utilities to print.” Id. (footnotes omitted) 
(citing Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951); 
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 
1985)). Further, Yen notes that  
[i]f economic necessity were truly the only motivation for copyright, we 
would remove copyright protection from these works and any others which 
would be produced in the absence of copyright. Granting these works 
copyright induces no economic gain. If anything, economic welfare would 
increase if the public gained free access to these works through a denial of 
copyright. Our reluctance to take such a course of action demonstrates the 
natural law vindication of an author’s creation in our copyright law. 
Id. 
110 Further, the utilitarian objections to awarding performers increased author-
ial protection revolve around the problem of “The Cast of Thousands”; however, this 
problem is minimized by the application of other copyright doctrines. See infra 
Section III.C. 
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1. Labor Rights to Creative Labor 
The natural rights theory can be traced back to the Roman 
natural law.111  Yet the “most famous proponent” of this view is 
John Locke.112  Locke articulated that: 
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to 
all men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this 
nobody has any right to but himself.  The labour of his body, 
and the work of his hands we may say are properly his.  
Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath 
provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and 
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property.113 
Thus, the central premise of the natural rights approach is that a 
person is entitled to the product of his or her labor.  Applying 
Locke’s principles, a creative contributor should have a right to 
his or her labor.  This application, however, depends in part on 
how broadly we define a creative contributor’s labor.   
The law defines creative labor capaciously.  To be copyrightable, 
a work need only exhibit a “modicum of creativity.”114  Further, 
courts largely should not “assess the artistic value of [a] work.”115  
These low thresholds of a creator’s creative contributions suggest 
that courts treat creative labor as labor, regardless of the depth 
of that creativity, or the value contributed by that creativity.116  
Thus, under a theory of natural rights, even a minority creative 
contributor ought to be entitled to the fruits born from his or her 
creative contribution. 
2. Personal Rights to Creative Labor 
The personality theory of property, posited by Hegel, justifies 
property as a form of self-expression.117  Though “the difference 
between [Locke] and Hegel—at least as to the analysis of intel-
 
111 Yen, supra note 104, at 522. 
112 Id. at 523. 
113 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 27 (J.W. 
Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1689). 
114 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991). 
115 Yen, supra note 104, at 533 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 
188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903)). 
116 See id. at 536 (“Although our early notions of copyright were very limited, 
copyright now protects nearly all creations of an author’s mind . . . .”). Yen also notes 
further requirements of copyrightability outside of the initial originality 
requirement at issue in our labor-focused analysis. Id. at 536–37. 
117 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 
329 (1988). 
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lectual property—may be minimal,” it is worth noting as an 
alternative justification for protecting the rights of creators.118   
Hegel’s theory of personhood proposes that persons are 
“abstract unit[s] of free will.”119  Therefore, a person’s continuing 
existence is premised on their ability to find “personal embodi-
ment or self-constitution” in the form of “things” in the external 
world.120  Consequently, because these “things” become constitu-
tively linked to the person, we should afford that person the free-
dom to control that “thing.”121  This control is afforded in the form 
of property rights.122 
In the context of intellectual property, a person often invests 
a great amount of his or her personhood into a work.123  This is 
particularly the case for highly expressive works.124  Thus, a per-
son becomes bound up in that work; that is, the work is linked to 
that person’s self-constitution.125  Thus, a person should be given 
a property right in that work to allow them to attain economic 
and noneconomic recognition for their personhood interest in that 
work.126  Accordingly, this supports the notion that performers, who 
 
118 Id. at 330. 
119 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 972 
(1982). 
120 Id. at 958.  
Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of 
themselves. These objects are closely bound up with personhood because 
they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal 
entities in the world. They may be as different as people are different, but 
some common examples might be a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, 
or a house.  
Id. at 959. 
121 Id. at 958, 960. 
122 See id. at 960. 
123 Hughes, supra note 117, at 340. “Poems, stories, novels, and musical works 
are clearly receptacles for personality. The same can be said for sculpture, paintings, 
and prints.” Id. The performing industries this Note focuses on can be highly 
expressive, as photographic subjects can identify with a photo taken of them, actors 
can identify with a role or character, and musical performers can identify with their 
rendition of a particular song. 
124 Id. at 341. “We should be more willing to accord legal protection to the fruits 
of highly expressive intellectual activities, such as the writing of novels, than to the 
fruits of less expressive activities, such as genetic research.” William Fisher, 
Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 171 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 1st ed. 2001). 
125 Hughes, supra note 117, at 340. This justifies a person’s “persona.” Id. 
Though no labor is required to produce a “persona,” “[a]s long as a person identifies 
with his personal image” he or she will have a Hegelian interest in that persona. Id. 
at 340–41. 
126 See id. at 350. “Authors and inventors should be permitted to earn respect, 
honor, admiration, and money from the public by selling or giving away copies of 
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invest so much of themselves—or to the degree they do so in any 
work—be awarded copyright interests in a given work. 
II.  COPYRIGHT DOCTRINES RELEVANT TO 
RESOLVE THE DISPARATE PROTECTION OF 
PERFORMERS’ AUTHORIAL RIGHTS 
A. Work for Hire Doctrine 
Under the Copyright Act, initial ownership of a copyright 
vests “in the author or authors of the work.”127  This means that 
“an individual who writes, composes, or paints an original work 
of authorship on her or his own acquires the copyright upon the 
work’s creation.”128  However, in the modern day works are often 
produced in an employment context.129  Because of this reality, 
the law has recognized authorial rights in employers in the work 
for hire doctrine.130  A work is considered to be a “work made for 
hire” if that work is  
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or 
her employment; or  
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contri-
bution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as 
a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer 
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree 
in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be 
considered a work made for hire.131 
If a work meets this threshold, an “employer or other person for 
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for the 
purposes of [Title 17], and, unless the parties have expressly 
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns 
all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”132   
The second subsection expressly protects nine enumerated 
types of works, including films, so long as there is a signed 
 
their works, but should not be permitted to surrender their right to prevent others 
from mutilating or misattributing their works.” Fisher, supra note 124, at 172. 
127 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2018).  
128 MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 91, at 587. 
129 See id.  
130 See id. at 587–88. This doctrine has been justified by the impact on reducing 
transaction costs. Id. at 594. The doctrine attempts to prevent the potential problem 
of having a contributor limit the commercialization of a possible work by acting as a 
“holdout.” Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
131 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
132 Id. § 201(b). 
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written agreement stating that the work is a work for hire.133  
However, this section is not applicable to photographs or sound 
recordings per se.134  Though that subsection of the statutory text 
offers a clear definition of when the work for hire doctrine applies 
in certain works, the first subsection offers little instruction to 
what is meant by “employee,” making the scope of its application 
ambiguous.135  In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 
the Supreme Court addressed this lack of instruction and 
introduced a test to determine whether a creator is an “employee” 
for the purposes of the work for hire doctrine.136   
In that case, a sculptor agreed to build a sculpture for a 
nonprofit organization that sought to end homelessness in 
America.137  The agreement was not memorialized in writing, and 
neither party addressed copyright.138  The sculptor completed and 
delivered the statue and was paid $15,000 for the completed 
statue; however, the statue was returned to the sculptor for 
minor repairs.139  Later, the nonprofit sought to take the statue 
on a tour around various cities to raise awareness for home-
lessness.140  The sculptor objected and refused to turn over the 
statue, stating that the statue’s material would not tolerate the 
rigors of a tour.141  The sculptor filed a certificate of copyright, 
after which the nonprofit filed a competing certificate of copy-
right; in assessing their competing claims, the district court and 
circuit court focused on whether the sculptor was an employee of 
the nonprofit under 17 U.S.C. § 101(1).142   
The Supreme Court determined that in assessing whether a 
party is an “employee” for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 101(1), the 
general common law rules of agency apply.143  Further, the Court 
outlined that, under the law of agency, courts should look to 
the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished[;] . . . the skill required; the 
source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
 
133 Id. § 101(2). 
134 See id. 
135 See MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 91, at 588.  
136 490 U.S. 730, 738–39 (1989). 
137 Id. at 733. 
138 Id. at 734. 
139 Id. at 735. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 735–36. 
143 Id. at 740–41.  
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work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of 
payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; 
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring 
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of 
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.144 
Applying this test, the Court determined that the sculptor was 
the author of the sculpture.145  Notwithstanding that designer’s 
particular outcome, the work for hire exception offers strong 
copyright protection to employers, even outside of an express 
agreement, sometimes, at the expense of creators or performers.  
B. Joint Author Doctrine 
A “joint work” is one “prepared by two or more authors with 
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable 
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”146  Courts have in-
terpreted this definition to additionally require that (1) each joint 
author contribute work that is independently copyrightable, and 
(2) both parties demonstrate an intention to be joint authors 
when making such contributions.147   
However, in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, the Ninth Circuit re-
quired that the person seeking authorship over the work control 
the work.148  In that case, the Ninth Circuit denied a contributor 
authorial rights in a Malcom X biopic based on his lack of “super-
 
144 Id. at 751–52. 
145 Id. at 752–53. The Court pointed to the fact that sculpting requires a lot of 
skill. Id. at 752. Further, the Court noted that the sculptor used his own tools and 
studio; was unsupervised; only worked for the nonprofit for two months for a 
singular task; and was not formally recognized as an employee for tax purposes. Id. 
at 752–53. 
146 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
147 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200–01 (2d Cir. 1998); Aalmuhammed v. 
Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Professors 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Justin Hughes, Peter Menell, and David Nimmer in 
Support of Neither Party at 12, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(No. 12-57302); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (“Under the definition of section 101, a work is ‘joint’ if the 
authors collaborated with each other, of [sic] if each of the authors prepared his or 
her contribution with the knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the 
contributions of other authors as ‘inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole.’ ”).  
148 202 F.3d at 1234–35. 
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intendence” over the film.149  There, Aalmuhammed was hired to 
work on the film, and he specifically reviewed the script and 
suggested extensive revisions, some of which were included in 
the final work.150  Further, 
Aalmuhammed submitted evidence that he directed Denzel 
Washington and other actors while on the set, created at least 
two entire scenes with new characters, translated Arabic into 
English for subtitles, supplied his own voice for voice-overs, 
selected the proper prayers and religious practices for the 
characters, and edited parts of the movie during post 
production.151 
Aalmuhammed was paid for his work, but when he sought 
authorship recognition in the credits, he was rebuffed.152  
Instead, he was listed in the credits as an “Islamic Technical 
Consultant.”153  Aalmuhammed sued Spike Lee and the produc-
tion companies seeking, in relevant part, a declaratory judgment 
that the movie was a “joint work.”154  The court refused to give 
Aalmuhammed that relief.155  The court reasoned that although 
he had contributed significantly to the work, Aalmuhammed was 
not a joint author because he did not “master mind” the work.156  
Further, the court noted that the parties lacked the requisite 
intent to form a joint author relationship.157 
 
149 Id. at 1229, 1235. 
150 Id. at 1229–30. 




155 Id. at 1235. 
156 Id. (“Aalmuhammed offered no evidence that he was the ‘inventive or master 
mind’ of the movie.”). 
157 Id.  
[N]either Aalmuhammed, nor Spike Lee, nor Warner Brothers, made any 
objective manifestations of an intent to be coauthors. Warner Brothers 
required Spike Lee to sign a “work for hire” agreement, so that even Lee 
would not be a coauthor and co-owner with Warner Brothers. It would be 
illogical to conclude that Warner Brothers, while not wanting to permit Lee 
to own the copyright, intended to share ownership with individuals like 
Aalmuhammed who worked under Lee’s control, especially ones who at the 
time had made known no claim to the role of coauthor.  
Id. 
2020] SO YOU WANT TO BE AN AUTHOR 291 
C. Implied License Doctrine 
In order to transfer an exclusive license in a copyright, there 
must be a writing.158  Yet, “nonexclusive licenses may . . . be 
granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct.”159  To 
create an implied license, “(1) a person (the licensee) requests the 
creation of a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that 
particular work and delivers it to the licensee who requested it, 
and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee-requestor copy and 
distribute his work.”160 
III.  A REFORMED JOINT AUTHORSHIP STANDARD 
AS A VEHICLE TO EQUALIZE RIGHTS OF PERFORMERS 
A. Reforming the Joint Author Standard 
Intellectual property scholars have questioned the Ninth 
Circuit’s addition of the element of superintendence to the joint 
author analysis in Aalmuhammed v. Lee.161  This is because the 
superintendence requirement to establish joint authorship law 
fundamentally ignores the collaborative nature of many per-
formance industries.162  
To recognize the collaborative nature of many performance 
industries, courts should adopt the approach posited by 
intellectual property scholar Justin Hughes.163  Namely, he argues 
that courts remove the requirement of superintendence.164  Thus, 
as Hughes has proposed, the standard should simply require that 
(1) the authors each contribute copyrightable expression, and 
 
158 Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990); 3 NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 49, § 10.03(A)(1)(a). 
159 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 10.03(A)(7), quoted with approval in 
Effects Assocs., Inc., 908 F.2d at 558. 
160 I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Effects Assocs., 
908 F.2d at 558–59). 
161 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 147, at 13; see also Section II.B. 
162 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 147, at 13-14. “The nature of a collabora-
tive enterprise is such that at times different authors will exercise more control than 
the others over the work. To require a contributor to exercise equal ‘inventive’ con-
trol in order to be a joint author is therefore unrealistic.” Id. (citation omitted); see 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1738 
(2014).  
163 Hughes, supra note 4, at 62, 64; see also Maria Solis, Lens of London: 
Granting Limited Copyright Protection for Performers 1, 11 (Aug. 25, 2018) (unpub-
lished working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3306360 (advocating for the use of 
joint authorship doctrine in motion pictures to permit actors to assert authorship 
over their important contributions). 
164 Hughes, supra note 4, at 61–62. 
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(2) the parties prepare that contribution with the intention that 
the work be merged inseparably.165  This should require a fact-
sensitive analysis of the individual contributions each contribu-
tor made. 
Copyrightable contributions require only a low level of 
creativity.166  But the creativity required by this standard has 
been disputed.167  While some scholars advocate for a require-
ment that each author contribute an individually copyrightable 
work, others advocate for a standard requiring a contribution 
that is merely not de minimis.168  However, requiring a strong 
contribution would not be in line with precedent suggesting only 
a “minimal degree of creativity” is required to secure copyright 
protection, nor would it acknowledge the reality of creative 
works.169  Thus, as Hughes argues, courts should not enforce a 
strong originality requirement in order to find joint authorship of 
a work.170 
The second prong of Hughes’ proposed analysis might be 
more fraught, since in the absence of a contract, it can be difficult 
to determine the parties’ intentions.171  This prong turns on wheth-
er the parties intended, at the time the work was created, to 
merge their contributions inseparably.172  While this seems easy 
to determine, parties must also intend to be joint authors, and 
not solely intend to merge their contributions.173  This prong would 
require a fact-sensitive inquiry. 
 
165 Id. at 59, 64. 
166 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
167 Hughes, supra note 4, at 59–60. 
168 Id. This requirement will alleviate some of the concerns that plagued the 
Ninth Circuit in Garcia and Aalmuhammed, since not every contributor of a work 
will be able to assert ownership—only those who contribute enough. 
169 Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345; see also Hughes, supra note 4, at 60–61 
(“[A] strong ‘independently copyrightable contribution’ ” standard is specifically “in-
compatible with our common thinking about films. While the contribution of an actor 
might be imagined, or even shot, in isolation, there is no original expression from a 
film director or cinematographer that can be separated from what is done by other 
contributors. Yet in many jurisdictions, film directors are presumed to be the 
authors of audiovisual works.”) (footnotes omitted). But see Joseph Miller, Hoisting 
Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 458 (2009) (arguing for a stronger standard for 
originality in copyright). 
170 Hughes, supra note 4, at 60. 
171 See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000). 
172 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5736. 
173 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).  
The wording of the statutory definition appears to make relevant only the 
state of mind regarding the unitary nature of the finished work—an 
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Additionally, the law surrounding joint authorship “treats 
joint authors as tenants-in-common.”174  This means that in most 
cases, joint authors will share coequal ownership over the entire 
work.175  Hughes suggests that this approach is flawed.176  Indeed, 
he argues that “nothing in the Copyright Act requires that out-
come and the legislative history indicates that that was not 
Congress’s intent.”177   
Accepting Hughes’ approach, common law principles should 
guide a tenancy-in-common determination.178  And, at most, “the 
common law has a rebuttable presumption of equal ownership 
shares and that presumption is rebutted by clear evidence of 
intent, unequal contribution, or other circumstances establishing 
that equal ownership would be inappropriate.”179  This suggests 
that, in the copyright context, courts should engage in a factual 
inquiry to determine the extent of a party’s contribution to a 
work to determine the extent of their authorship.  This view 
would be able to justly determine authorship given the collab-
orative nature of the creative industries.180  Thus, adopting a fact-
 
intention “that their contributions be merged into inseparable or inter-
dependent parts of a unitary whole.” However, an inquiry so limited would 
extend joint author status to many persons who are not likely to have been 
within the contemplation of Congress. . . . What distinguishes the writer-
editor relationship and the writer-researcher relationship from the true 
joint author relationship is the lack of intent of both participants in the 
venture to regard themselves as joint authors. 
Id. 
174 MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 91, at 607. 
175 Id. 
176 Hughes, supra note 4, at 64 (suggesting that this presumption has tainted 
courts’ openness to award joint authorship rights based on the severe relief granted 
to a joint author). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 65. 
179 Id. 
180 Currently, the law around musicians recognizes that creative contributions 
can come in different degrees, and thus ownership should be treated accordingly. 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.3 (“In some cases, however, the main or 
sole contribution may be production authorship (as in a recording of bird songs, 
where there is no human performance) or the main contribution may be performance 
authorship (as in a recorded performance where the only production involved is to 
push the ‘record’ button).”).  
The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though 
not always, involve “authorship” both on the part of the performers whose 
performance is captured and on the part of the record producer responsible 
for setting up the recording session, capturing and electronically processing 
the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final sound 
recording. There may, however, be cases where the record producer’s 
contribution is so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable 
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sensitive approach of authorship would not only comport with 
common law principles surrounding tenancy-in-common,181 but 
also acknowledge the individual creative labors of specific works, 
since awarding authorship for the relative creative labor of the 
parties would validate each party’s creative labor.  
B. The Reformed Joint Author Standard as an Equalizer 
The photography, film, and music industries are all col-
laborative in nature.182  Yet, the law only recognizes the joint 
authorship of musical performers.183  This leaves performers in 
the similarly collaborative industries of photography and acting 
without access to similar protection.184  Applying Hughes’ joint 
authorship standard would correct this disparity in protection 
and afford a viable opportunity for joint authorship to photo-
graphic subjects and actors.   
The first requirement of Hughes’ joint authorship standard 
requires that each party makes at least a non–de minimis 
contribution.185  Performers in the photography, film, and music 
industries all have the potential to contribute non–de minimis 
creative labor—that is, some “minimal degree of creativity.”186  
For example, photographic subjects can spontaneously and cre-
atively add value to a photograph in a way not imagined or 
intended by the photographer.187  Likewise, actors can create 
strong, realistic characters and produce emotional connections 
with the audience.188  Finally, musicians create their own songs 
or perform pre-composed songs in an original and novel way.189  
 
element in the work, and there may be cases (for example, recordings of 
birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, et cetera) where only the record producer’s 
contribution is copyrightable.  
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669. 
However, the photography and film industries likewise are industries based on vary-
ing degrees of creative contributions. See supra Section I.A. 
181 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121. 
182 See supra Section I.A; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56. 
183 See supra Section I.B.3. Indeed, the foundation of musical performers’ in-
creased protection stems from Congress’ recognition of the collaborative nature of 
the music industry, and of the relevant creative labor expended by performers in 
that industry. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56. 
184 See supra Sections I.B.1–2. 
185 See supra Section III.A. 
186 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
187 See supra Section I.A.1.  
188 See supra Section I.A.2.  
189 See supra Section I.A.3.  
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Next, the parties must intend to merge their contributions 
inseparably.190  While this seems simple to assert,191 parties must 
also intend to be joint authors, and not solely intend to merge 
their contributions.192  This will be a fact-sensitive inquiry, but 
there is nothing that would prohibit a performer and a producer 
or other putative author from having the requisite intent to be 
joint authors.  Indeed, in the field of sound recordings, musicians 
and producers generally intend to be joint authors.193  This re-
flects the natural intuition that a reasonable person, all things 
being equal, would intend to maintain authorship over their 
contribution to a work.194  Thus, absent a contrary indication, a 
reasonable performer would likely intend to maintain authorial 
rights in his or her contributions. 
And, finally, courts should engage in an analysis into the rel-
ative contributions of joint authors, in order to award authorial 
shares that are equitable in the circumstances.195  Under this 
reformed standard, authorship rights of photographic subjects 
and actors would be elevated to approximate the protections 
already afforded to musical performers.  This reformed standard 
would account for their labor rights in their creative contri-
 
190 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5736. 
191 A photographic subject plainly intends to have his or her image and any 
creativity “merged” into the final photograph, an actor clearly intends to have his or 
her performance “merged” into the final film, and a musical performer certainly 
expects that his or her performance will be “merged” onto the final sound recording. 
192 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).  
The wording of the statutory definition appears to make relevant only the 
state of mind regarding the unitary nature of the finished work—an 
intention “that their contributions be merged into inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” However, an inquiry so limited 
would extend joint author status to many persons who are not likely to 
have been within the contemplation of Congress. . . . What distinguishes 
the writer-editor relationship and the writer-researcher relationship from 
the true joint author relationship is the lack of intent of both participants 
in the venture to regard themselves as joint authors. 
Id. 
193 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.8(B). “Generally, where there are 
multiple authors of a sound recording, the sound recording is a joint work and the 
applicant should name all the authors of that work. In such cases, the authors’ 
contributions are not subject to separate registrations.” Id. (emphasis added). 
194 Hughes notes that, in the context of actors, “[g]iven all that dramatic 
performers think about their craft, it seems unlikely that the actor would think she 
is not an author.” Hughes, supra note 4, at 64. 
195 Hughes, supra note 4, at 59–60. Though, admittedly, this would require a 
tremendous amount of court resources, it would allow for a more equitable system of 
copyright protection. 
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butions by acknowledging their copyrightable contributions in a 
particular work, allowing for their intent to preserve ownership 
over those contributions and permitting them to assert author-
ship of those contributions. 
C. Taking on “The Cast of Thousands” 
The predominant policy concern guiding the Ninth Circuit in 
its decision to deny authorial rights in performance to Cindy 
Garcia is illustrative of possibly the biggest utilitarian concern 
about awarding performers rights in works.  This is the fear of 
awarding authorship rights to “the proverbial ‘cast of thou-
sands,’ ” that is, works with many contributors.196   
This concern is rooted in the utilitarian goal of copyright law 
to “foster[ ] . . . the optimal use and dissemination of [literary and 
artistic] works.”197  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit expressed concern 
that “[t]reating every acting performance as an independent work 
would not only be a logistical and financial nightmare, it would 
turn cast of thousands into a new mantra: copyright of thou-
sands.”198  Though that case dealt with the film industry, this 
same concern extends into the other industries discussed above.  
For example, the same problem may arise for photographs with 
multiple subjects, or sound recordings with several band 
members.  Yet, in the latter scenario, the law unequivocally 
protects the individual authorial rights of creative contribu-
tors,199 and fairness dictates equal treatment across media.  
Despite the threat of the “copyright of thousands,” it need not be 
a foregone conclusion that offering performers protection will 
truly lead to this feared result.200  Indeed, as Hughes described, 
“worrying about ‘copyright of thousands’ in audiovisual works is 
like worrying about snow in South Florida.”201 
 
196 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015). 
197 MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 91, at 500. 
198 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 743. 
199 NIMMER &NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.8(B) (“a recording of a song might be 
jointly authored by the members of a band, or a singer”). 
200 Hughes, supra note 4, at 51. 
201 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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1. Contractual Protections 
In the film and music industries, the work for hire doctrine 
reigns.202  Indeed, in the film industry, performances are “almost 
always governed” by contracts, which establish the authorial 
rights in the producers.203  In the realm of photography, the con-
tractual provision of the work for hire protections does not 
apply.204  However, some courts have recognized a quasi–work for 
hire doctrine in the recognition of ownership rights for consumers 
who pay to be photographed.205  And indeed, the general provi-
sions of assignment contracts remain a source for contractually 
asserting rights.206  Yet, performers remain in fairly weak bar-
gaining positions.207  Thus, “most performers are unable to obtain 
significant rights beyond the minimums guaranteed by collective 
bargaining agreements.”208 
Given this context, particularly in the film industry where 
work for hire principles apply and contracts are almost always 
made to privately organize authorship rights, protecting the 
rights of performers is unlikely to have uproarious repercussions.  
Indeed, awarding authorial rights to performers may increase 
producers’ initiative to clearly delineate authorship rights pri-
vately via contract.  Further, awarding creative contributors au-
thorial rights as a default rule may actually serve to increase the 
bargaining power of performers.  This may lead to a more leveled 
negotiating table—and fairer agreements—when parties engage 
in contractually organizing rights. 
Further, if the work for hire doctrine fails to award full 
ownership to an employer or commissioning party, there remains 




202 Id. at 53–54; Mary LaFrance, Are We Serious About Performers’ Rights?, 5 IP 
THEORY 81, 83 (2015). These agreements often provide minimal rights because of the 
performers’ relatively weak bargaining positions. LaFrance, supra, at 81–83. 
203 Hughes, supra note 4, at 51. Indeed, “performers’ economic and moral rights 
in the works they help to create depend almost entirely on the contracts they 
negotiate with producers.” LaFrance, supra note 202. 
204 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
205 See supra Section I.A; Subotnik, supra note 15, at 458. Subotnik points out 
that this was based on a presumed assignment of rights from the photographer to 
the subject. Subotnik, supra note 15, at 458. 
206 17 U.S.C. § 204. 
207 LaFrance, supra note 202. 
208 Id. These minimum protections are even further diminished in nonunionized 
contexts. 
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authorship.  This is the “two” in the “one-two punch” for ensuring 
that producers retain unfettered control over a work: implied 
licenses.209   
Thus, an implied license would exist where  
the film producer [or photographer] requests the performance; 
the actor [or photographic subject] gives the performance [or 
sits for the photograph] and delivers it while authorizing its 
fixation by the film producer [or photographer]; and the actor 
[or photographic subject] intends that the film producer [or 
photographer] copy and distribute the performance [or 
photograph].210 
This, too, will serve to prevent creative contributors from assert-
ing certain holdout postures based on claimed authorship over 
works and thus prevent the “cast of thousands.”  Indeed, this doc-
trine may even govern the above examples regarding Johnny 
Cash and Timothée Chalamet—absent any contracts.  Marshall 
sought to photograph Cash, Cash allowed Marshall to photo-
graph him, and Cash likely knew, and intended, that Marshall 
was going to distribute that photograph of him.  Chalamet was 
hired to play Elio in Call Me by Your Name, he allowed the 
producer to record his performance, and intended for the movie, 
and thus his performance, to be distributed. 
2. De Minimis Contributions 
In order to get copyright protection, a work must have a 
non–de minimis amount of creativity.211  Indeed, where a copy-
right application lists multiple authors, all must make non–de 
minimis contributions.212  This requirement will also serve to limit 
the risk of the “cast of thousands.”  In the context of film, Hughes 
observed: 
In normal circumstances, the best boy—an assistant to an elec-
trician on a film crew—would not contribute any original 





209 Hughes, supra note 4, at 55. 
210 Id. at 56. 
211 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64 (1991). 
212 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 618.8(D)(3). “If two or more authors are 
named in the application, and if it appears that one of the authors contributed de 
minimis authorship to the work, the specialist will ask for permission to remove that 
author’s information from the registration record.” Id. 
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marketplace or battle scene: they probably contribute no origi-
nal expression and, if they do, unauthorized reproduction would 
likely be de minimis.213 
In the context of photography, the doctrine likewise applies.214  
Thus, where a photographic subject only provides the de minimis 
creative contribution of merely being in a photograph, he or she 
will fail to assert any authorship over that photograph.  Thus, 
this doctrine would also function as an effective tool in prevent-
ing the feared “cast of thousands,” as actors and photographic 
subjects who fail to exhibit the “modicum of creativity” required 
for copyright protection will be prohibited from asserting 
authorship in the work.215  
D. Treaty Aspects 
Given the difficulty performers can face in seeking author-
ship recognition in a work,216 treaties may offer performers 
certain rights outside of authorship to reward their creative labor 
to some extent.  “Compared to treaties addressing authors’ rights, 
international agreements on performers’ rights are relatively 
recent developments.”217  Indeed, the 1886 signing of the Berne 
Convention marked the first multilateral agreement with regard 
to authors’ rights.218  Yet multilateral treaties only addressed 
performers’ rights starting in 1961, with the signing of the Rome 
Convention, which the United States has not joined, and which 
afforded “performers the right to prevent unauthorized broad-
casting and recording of their live performances.”219 
In 1994, the United States joined a treaty recognizing per-
formers’ rights for the first time.220  This shift came with the 
enactment of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
 
213 Hughes, supra note 4, at 52 (footnotes omitted). 
214 See, e.g., Tang v. Putruss, 521 F. Supp. 2d 600, 605 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
215 Arguably, this “cast of thousands” may only come after possibly expensive 
litigation, or threat thereof. 
216 LaFrance, supra note 202. 
217 Id. at 86. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 86. 
In the case of sound recordings, performers could also prevent reproduc-
tions of recordings that exceeded the scope of their original consent. While 
the treaty also recognized a performance right in sound recordings, this 
right was limited to equitable remuneration payable to either the producer 
or the performers; the allocation was left up to the signatory countries.  
Id. at 86–87 (footnotes omitted). 
220 Id. at 87. 
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lectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), which “requires signatories to 
recognize performers’ rights to prevent the unauthorized 
recording of their live performances in ‘phonograms’ as well as 
any reproductions of those unauthorized recordings.”221  This led 
to the enactment of anti-bootlegging provisions, which impose 
civil and criminal penalties on those who reproduce live per-
formances without authorization, in the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act.222 
Additionally, in 1996, the United States signed WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”).223  This treaty 
requires that signatories recognize an extensive range of 
performers’ moral and economic rights.224  Yet, this “has had no 
effects on performers’ rights under [United States] law.”225  Most 
recently, in 2012, the United States signed the Beijing Agree-
ment.226  The Beijing Agreement seeks to recognize the moral and 
economic rights of audiovisual performers, similar to what the 
WPPT sought to accomplish for sound recording performances.227 
In the face of these treaties, Congress is faced with changing 
copyright law in order to comply with the treaties’ requirements to 
recognize performers’ moral and economic rights.228  Thus, “[t]aking 




222 Id. at 82 & n.8, 87–88. 
223 Id. at 88.  
224 Id. “Many of [WPPT’s] provisions, however, apply only to performers on 
sound recordings.” Id. 
225 Id. at 89 (“For instance, as was true prior to the WPPT, recording artists can 
assert rights of attribution and integrity over their recorded material only if they re-
serve these rights in their contracts with producers. While recording contracts 
typically call for performers to be credited on their recordings, certain forms of ex-
ploitation may be excluded. Similar limits apply to integrity rights; because the 
record company owns the copyright in the recording, typically, a performer can 
prevent alteration of the work only by negotiating for this right in the recording 
contract.”). 
226 WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=841 (last visited Oct. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
YG4V-FYCK]. The treaty has not yet been ratified. Id. 
227 LaFrance, supra note 202, at 89–90. 
228 Id. at 91 (“To comply with the treaties, Congress would have to adopt specific 
moral rights legislation for performers that is at least comparable to the protections 
that [current law] extends to the authors of works of visual art.”). 
229 Id. at 92 (“The United States must also address performers’ rights in order to 
comply with our current international treaty obligations, as well as the new 
obligations that will arise when [the] Beijing [Agreement] enters into force. Yet 
Congress has made no effort to implement WPPT, raising doubts as to future 
compliance with [the] Beijing [Agreement].”).  
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CONCLUSION 
Protecting the fruits of performers’ creative endeavors is 
paramount.  In 1972, Congress recognized this reality in its limit-
ed protection of sound recordings.230  This crucial move served to 
partly vindicate the creative labor of musical performers and 
entitled them to some of the fruits borne out of their creative 
labor.  Yet, copyright law more generally continues to ignore the 
labor rights of performers in other fields; notably, in the fields of 
photography and film.  This does not have to persist.  Indeed, the 
law may already have an avenue to equalize the rights of 
different performers via the doctrine of joint authorship, as an 
expansive reading of that doctrine would serve to honor the 
creative contributions of performers and equalize the rights of 
creative contributors across media.  Thus, courts should adopt a 
broader view of joint authorship and stop perpetuating the 
inequality among performers of different industries. 
 
230 This was through the passage of the Sound Recording Act of 1972, preserved 
in the 1976 Copyright Act. 
